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ABSTRACT
Software components are characterised by their functional and non-functional properties. It
is both difficult and expensive to build a software component that excels in all its non-
functional properties and that can cope with a large input range for all environmental
variables. We envisage to provide a computing system operating in a changing environment
with a pool of software components, each having a specific profile, and a decision maker
that selects the best component subject to the time varying environmental requirements. The
resulting decision problem is a multi-attribute optimisation problem. In this paper, we
propose several solution concepts for this problem and evaluate them qualitatively with
respect to many criteria. Two of these concepts are treated in detail. The first is based on
the combined utility function and the second is the compromise between the preference
patterns of the various properties. The latter is game theoretic, and the solution is found by
formulating the problem as a bargaining game. While the combined utility function can be
expressed in a simple form when some independence assumptions between the properties
hold, and it can incorporate the decision maker’s value trade-offs, it involves evaluating
subjectively a number of coefficients. But because the evaluations also need to be performed
during run-time for new requirements, this becomes problematic. The game theoretic
solution does not incorporate explicitly the decision maker’s value trade-offs, but it is free
of the subjective element and no evaluations are needed during run-time.
Key words: Non-functional requirements; Utility functions; Multi-attribute optimisation;
Value trade-offs; Game theory.
21. Introduction
There is an increasing interest in component-based software engineering- see, for example,
the special issue ‘Working with Components’ of IEEE Software (September/October
1998). Included are articles on testing by Weyuker, architecture by Ben-Shaul et al, and
applications in telecommunications by Zave and Jackson. In this paper, we consider the
decision problems which arise in a component-based software system operating in a
changing environment.
Software components are characterised by their functional and non-functional properties or
attributes (NF-attributes). It is both difficult and expensive to build a software component
that excels in all its non-functional attributes and that can cope with a large input range for
all environmental variables. Trade-offs between the attributes have to be made during the
design of a software component. Moreover, the NF-requirements from the environment
may vary during run-time. For example, the available memory space may be limited
sometimes but large at other times. So, instead of having only a single component to cope
with all eventualities, the system will be provided with several components that excel in
different attributes. The system will then have a decision making algorithm that selects the
best component for the situation. The objective of this paper is to describe the framework of
the decision process and the issues that arise in its implementation.
The decision problem that we have is called a multi-attribute optimisation problem in the
Decision Theory literature. The usual solution of this class of problems involves the
construction of a utility function which amalgamates all the attributes, or a combined utility
function (abbreviated CUF). During the construction process, the owner of the computing
system, to whom we refer as the decision maker (abbreviated DM), is asked to compare
alternatives or lotteries of alternatives. These comparisons are done using either the method
of Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) or more recently, fuzzy decision making.
We describe the representation of the CUF introduced by Keeney, see Keeney & Raiffa
(1976). This representation applies when some independence assumptions between the
attributes are satisfied. It greatly simplifies the construction as it reduces the process to the
evaluation of utility functions for each attribute in isolation or individual utility functions,
and the evaluation of a small number of scaling coefficients. We discuss the problems that
3may be encountered when the CUF approach is part of the decision support system of an
autonomous computing system operating in a changing environment.
If the DM is not capable to form value trade-offs between the attributes because of the
complexity of their interactions, or because the CUF is difficult to evaluate on-line for new
requirements, we consider another solution which is a compromise between the preference
patterns of all NF-attributes. We show that this is the solution of a bargaining game, where
the players are agents, each one representing the interests of a single attribute, negotiating
about which alternative is to be selected. We find the solution of this game by maximising
the Nash product which represents a collective utility function - see Moulin (1988). This
solution, called the Nash solution, achieves a compromise between all attributes, but it does
not incorporate any interaction of preferences among the attributes.
In section 2, we introduce a model of a system of software components operating in an
environment with changing NF-requirements. In section 3, we describe briefly the
construction of the individual utility functions using the method of Von Neumann &
Morgenstern (1947) and how to carry out the construction on-line for new requirements. In
section 4, we consider two solution concepts for the selection problem. In the first part, we
describe the representation of the CUF introduced by Keeney, and show how to use off-line
data to make assessments on-line. In the second part, we describe the Nash solution for the
bargaining game and discuss its use for our problem and explain its shortcomings. We
illustrate this solution concept by solving an example. In the third part, we describe other
solution concepts that are simpler but which use only a small amount of the available
information. In section 5, we evaluate qualitatively the different solution concepts with
respect to criteria such as the required information, the type of solution obtained, and the
computational effort.
2. General Model of a System of Software Components
We have a computer system containing M  software components or algorithms denoted by
A A AM1 2, ,...., . { }Α = A A AM1 2, ,....,  is the set of available alternatives or the selection set.
These components have a number of properties or attributes that can be classified into
functional attributes and non-functional attributes (NF-attributes).
4A functional attribute of a given component specifies the range of the environmental
variable input that it can handle. Examples of NF-attributes are reliability, performance,
maintainability, cost and capacity.
Let I l , l L= 1 2, ,..., , be the input environmental variables, and for m M= 1 2, ,..., , let IRml
denote the range of variable input Il  that component Am  can handle.
Let X X X N1 2, ,....,  be N  NF-attributes.
Let amn  be the value of attribute X n  in component Am , where m M= 1 2, ,..., , and
n N= 1 2, ,..., . Depending on the attribute, amn  can be either a real, or an integer number.
Without loss of generality, we will assume throughout this paper that the values amn  are
real numbers for all attributes.
The environment in which the system operates imposes both functional and non-functional
requirements (NF-requirements).
Functional requirements:
Let EIl  be the range of input variable Il  that the system receives from the current
environment. All functional requirements are strict in that the system can only use a
component that can handle the whole input ranges for all input variables.
NF-requirements:
Let CVn , be the range of values of attribute X n  that are required or desired by the
environment at a certain time. For some attributes, CVn  is the set of values that are less
than or equal to a critical value cvn , and for others it is the set of values greater than or
equal to a critical value cvn . For some attributes, the environmental requirements are strict,
but for others they are only desirable, that is, the critical values represent only levels of
aspiration. When the requirements are strict, any component that does not satisfy them is
excluded from the selection set.
The objective is to choose the best alternative for some specified environmental
requirements. This is an optimisation problem with many attributes or a multi-attribute
decision problem. This class of problems has been intensely investigated in the literature;
see, for example, Keeney & Raiffa (1976) or Chankong & Haines (1983).
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the available software components are
available for selection.
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Let a m m m mNa a a= ( , ,..., )1 2  be the vector specifying component Am , m M= 1 2, ,..., .
Vector a m  will be referred to as the profile of alternative Am . The problem is then to
choose between M  profile vectors corresponding to M  software components with N
attributes, subject to the environmental requirements. In fact, we want to optimise
simultaneously all the attributes, and as a result we will have to make trade-offs or
compromises between them.
3. Construction of individual utility functions
In this section, we will consider each attribute individually. The quantification of the relative
preferences over the selection set is achieved by constructing empirically a utility function
using the expected utility method of Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) or fuzzy decision
making - see, for example, Seo (1995). The former is grounded in probability theory,
whereas the latter is grounded in fuzzy logic.
The utility function is by definition subjective, in that different DMs will arrive at different
functions and the same DM may arrive at different functions at different times. However,
there are good heuristics that yield utility functions that reflect accurately the true
preferences of the DM. Moreover, we deal with only one attribute at a time and the
construction is done off-line, hence good results can be achieved. In this paper, we only use
the method of Von Neumann & Morgenstern.
For n N= 1 2, ,..., , let { }a an
m M mn
( ) min0
1
=
≤ ≤
 and { }a an
m M mn
* max=
≤ ≤1
, and let [ ]RX a an n n= ( ) *,0  be
the range of values that attribute X n  can take over the available alternatives.
               NF-attributes                         Functional attributes
6For each NF-attribute X n , we want to construct a utility function [ ]u RXn n: ,→ 0 1  scaled
from 0 to 1. We say that un  is normalised.
Note that { }RX a a an n n Mn⊃ 1 2, ,..., . We choose to define the utility function over the whole
range RX n  instead of over the countable set { }a a an n Mn1 2, ,...,  for convenience.
Let x RXn n∈ . u xn n( )  is then the utility gained when a component has an amount xn  of
attribute X n .
In most of the remainder of this section, we drop the subscript n  from the notation, so that
u xn n( )  will be denoted by u x( ) , for example. We will only introduce it when it is
necessary.
For attribute X , let x x RXW B( ) ( ), ∈  be, respectively, the worst and best values among the
available alternatives. We assume the best (worst) alternative is the one with either the
highest or lowest value (lowest or highest value). Then { }x x a aW B( ) ( ) ( ) *, ,∈ 0 . As the utility
function is scaled from 0 to 1, we have u x B( )( ) = 0  and u xW( ) = 1.
Let x x x RX( ) ( ) ( ), ,1 2 3 ∈ , with x x x( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3< < . Let x p x( ) ( ); ;1 3  be the lottery in which
outcome x ( )1  occurs with probability p  and outcome x ( )3  occurs with probability 1− p .
The DM is then asked to give an estimate to the value of p  such that he will be indifferent
between the certainty outcome x ( )2  and the lottery x p x( ) ( ); ;1 3 . This process of estimating
p  is called the indifference experiment.
Let p  be the estimated value of p . Then
u x pu x p u x( )  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )2 1 31= + − .
So, if the utilities at points x ( )1  and x ( )3  are known, we can find the utility at point x ( )2 . We
always start with the x B( )  and x W( )  as the end-points with known utilities.
The indifference experiment is repeated for different triplets, and checks for consistency are
carried out periodically. Once the utility function is determined at a sufficient number of
points, we find the equation of the best fit curve to these points. Let [ ]h XR: ,→ 0 1  be its
7functional form. The process of construction stops when no serious inconsistencies are
found. Then
u x h x( ) ( ),=  for all x XR∈ .
The utility function u  must reflect the DM’s attitude to risk. We will consider the concept
of attitude to risk using indifference experiments involving lotteries of only two outcomes
that are real values. But the definitions can be generalised to all types of lotteries.
Definitions Let x ( )1 , x ( )2 ∈ RX , and 0 1< <p .
1. A DM is risk neutral if he is indifferent between the certainty outcome px p x( ) ( )( )1 21+ −
and the lottery x p x( ) ( ); ;1 2 . That is, the utility function u  is such that
 u px p x pu x p u x( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 21 1+ − = + − .
2. A DM is risk-averse if he prefers the certainty outcome px p x( ) ( )( )1 21+ −  to the lottery
x p x( ) ( ); ;1 2 . That is, the utility function u  is such that
 u px p x pu x p u x( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 21 1+ − > + − .
3.  A DM is risk-loving or risk-prone if he prefers the lottery x p x( ) ( ); ;1 2  to the certainty
outcome px p x( ) ( )( )1 21+ − . That is, the utility function u  is such that
u px p x pu x p u x( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 21 1+ − < + − .
There is a link between the DM’s attitude to risk and the form of his utility function. It is
summarised it the following theorem.
Theorem 1
1.  A DM is risk-averse if and only if his utility function is concave.
2.  A DM is risk-loving if and only if his utility function is convex.
3.  A DM is risk-neutral if and only if his utility function is linear.
Proof: See Keeney and Raiffa (1976), pp 149-151.
The DM can be risk-averse within a certain range of values, risk-prone within another
range, and risk-neutral within yet another range.  The following graph illustrates this point.
Suppose that high values are the most desired.
8Changing requirements:
The critical values for the attributes will change over time, and it follows that the utilities for
the alternatives will usually change too. Hence, the utility functions need to be constructed
for all possible values of cv . But we expect to have a small number of functional forms to
represent the utilities for all values of cv . For example:
u x
h x cv
h x cv
h x cv
h x cv
cv a
a cv a x cv
a cv a x cv
cv a
( )
( ; )
( ; )
( ; )
( ; )
,
,
,
,
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) *
( ) *
*
=
≤
< < ≤
< < >
≥





1
2
3
4
0
0
0
for
for
for
for
and
and
where h cv ii( ) (.; ), ,...,= 1 4 , are one-variable parametric functions.
This can be verified empirically by constructing the utility function for several values of cv .
The utilities for the alternatives can then be computed on-line for all possible values of cv .
For example, suppose that for attribute X n  the high values are the most desired. Suppose
also that for r  randomly selected values of cvn  lower than an( )0 , namely cv i rn
i( )
, ,...,= 1 , we
have verified that u x x cvn n n n
i( ) log( ) ,( )= − +λ γ where λ  and γ  are scaling coefficients.
Then it may be safe to assume that
u x x cvn n n n( ) log( )= − +λ γ ,  for all cv an n< ( )0 .
If for a given critical value, the DM is risk-neutral over the whole range, then the utility
function is independent of the critical value as we show in the following theorem. This is
0
1
Risk-
loving
Risk-
averse
 Risk-
neutral
x
u x( )
a ( )0 a*
9likely to occur for cv a< ( )0  if high values of the attribute are desired , and for cv a> *  if
low values of the attribute are desired.
Theorem 2 If the DM is risk-neutral over the whole interval RX  for critical value cv ,
then his utility function is independent of cv , and it is given by
Eq. 1                                             u x
x x
x x
W
B W( )
( )
( ) ( )=
−
−
.
Proof: From Theorem 1, the utility function of the DM is linear as he is risk-neutral. Hence
we can write
Eq. 2                                        u x f cv x g cv( ) ( ) ( )= + ,
where f cv g cv( ) ( )and   are two real functions of cv  independent of x .
Now, we know that u x W( )( ) = 0  and u x B( )( ) = 1, which combined with Eq. 2 yields
Eq. 3                                         f cv x g cvW( ) ( )( ) + = 0 ,
and
Eq. 4                                         f cv x g cvB( ) ( )( ) + = 1.
Solving Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 simultaneously, we obtain
f cv
x x
B W( ) ( ) ( )=
−
1
and
g cv
x
x x
W
B W( )
( )
( ) ( )=
−
−
.
And Eq. 1 follows immediately.        QED.
4. Solution Concepts
What do we mean by the best solution to the selection problem? Below, we will discuss
several solution concepts.
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4.1 Combined Utility
In multi-attribute decision making, we assume that the DM is able to choose between two
alternatives on the basis of their profile vectors. That is, the DM can choose the best of two
N-component vectors. This choice is not derived from more basic premises, it is subjective.
When the number of alternatives M  is small, the DM may be able to order them from the
most preferred to the least preferred with relative ease. But with a large number of
alternatives, it may be very tedious to do the ranking while being consistent. The problem
will be greatly simplified if we can construct a utility function which amalgamates all the
attributes, or a CUF with a simple expression. The optimal solution is then the alternative
with the highest combined utility.
When some independence assumptions between the individual attributes are verified, the
problem has a structure that makes it possible to express the combined utility in a simple
form. In fact, it is shown that, even when the assumptions are not verified for all attributes,
the utility function derived using these assumptions is still a good approximation.
Let [ ]U RX RX RX Ncv : .... ,1 2 0 1× × →  denote the DM’s CUF under environmental critical
values cv . U x x xNcv ( , ,...., )1 2  is then the utility gained if x x xN1 2, ,....,  are the values taken
by attributes X n , n N=1 2, ,....., , respectively. The problem is to find the form of the
N − variables  utility function U cv . For ease of notation, we will drop the subscript cv
from U cv .
There is an extensive literature on this problem- see, for example, Keeney & Raiffa (1976)
or Chankong & Haines (1983). A large part of this section is based on the former reference.
Therein, it is shown that, under some independence conditions that are satisfied in many
cases, it is possible to write U x x xN( , ,...., )1 2  in an additive or multiplicative forms. But
even after this simplification, the construction of the utility function is still very tedious, and
it is very difficult to achieve consistency.
We will only consider the so called utility independence assumption because it is the one
that is satisfied more often. We start by defining some terms that will be used subsequently.
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Definitions
1.  Let { }X X X X N= 1 2, ,....,  be the set of attributes. The complement of attribute X n  in
the set X  is the subset { }X X X X Xn n N1 2 1 1, ,..., , ,...− +  which we denote by X n .
2.  Attribute X n  is utility independent of its complement X n  if the conditional preference
order for lotteries involving only changes in the levels of attribute X n  does not depend
on the levels at which the attributes in X n  are held fixed.
For example, consider the following vector profiles:
( )ω ( ) ( ) ,1 11 1+ = +x x , ( )ω ( ) ( ) ,2 12 1+ = +x x , ( )ω ( ) ( ) ,3 13 1+ = +x x , ( )ω ( ) ( ) ,4 14 1+ = +x x .
x
i
1
( )
 is the level of attribute X 1  in profile ω
( )i +
, i = 1 4,.., . In all four outcomes, the
attributes in the complement of X 1  are fixed at level x1
+
.
Let ω ω( ) ( ); ;1 2
+ +
p , where 0 1≤ ≤p , be a lottery involving profiles ω ( )1
+
 and ω ( )2
+
.
Similarly, let ω ω( ) ( ); ;3 4
+ +
p , where 0 1≤ ≤q , be another lottery involving profiles ω ( )3
+
and ω ( )4
+
.
Suppose that lottery ω ω( ) ( ); ;1 2
+ +
p  is preferred to lottery ω ω( ) ( ); ;3 4
+ +
q . We then write
ω ω ω ω( ) ( ) ( ) ( ); ; ; ;1 2 3 4
+ + + +
p q .
Let ( )ω ( ) ( ) ,i ix x= 1 1 , i = 1 4,.. , be four other profiles in which all the complement attributes
of X 1  are at level x1 . Let ω ω
( ) ( ); ;1 2p  and ω ω( ) ( ); ;3 4q  be two other lotteries.
Attribute X 1  is utility independent of its complement attributes X 1  if
ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ); ; ; ; ; ; ; ;1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
+ + + +
⇒p q p q  , for all x1 .
Definition Attributes X X X N1 2, ,....,  are mutually utility independent if every subset of
{ }X X X N1 2, ,....,  is utility independent of its complement.
The next theorem gives the representation of the DM that involves only the individual one-
dimensional utility functions un  and N + 1 scaling constants. That is, the CUF can be
expressed in the form
U x x x H u x u x u x k kN N N N( , ,..., ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( ), ,...., )1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1= + ,
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where H  is a real valued function and k k k N1 2 1, ...., +  are constants.
Theorem 3 (Keeney & Raiffa 1976)   If attributes X X X N1 2, ,....,  are mutually utility
independent, then
Eq.5
U(x ,x ,....,x ) k u (x ) K k k u (x )u (x )
                                                      K k k k u (x )u (x )u (x )
                                                      ........ K k k .....k u (x )u (x )......u (x )  ,     
N n n n
n
N
n i n
n
n i
N
n i i
n i l n
n
n i
i l
N
n i i l l
N
N N N
1 2
1 1
2
1
1
1 2 1 1 2 2
= +
+
+ +
= =
<
=
<
<
−
∑ ∑
∑
where
( )k U x x x x x xn W W nW nB nW NW= − +1 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,..., , , ,...., , n N= 1 2, ,..., . ,
 and K  are scaling constants related by equation
Eq. 6                                                  1 1
1
+ = +
=
∏K Kkn
n
N
( ) .
Proof: See Keeney and Raiffa (1976), pp 289-291.
Scaling constant kn  is then the utility gained when attribute X n  takes the best value,
whereas all the other attributes take the worst values.
The scaling constants are meant to insure consistency among the individual utilities and
hence to incorporate the DM’s value trade-offs between the attributes. Therefore, the
constants cannot be evaluated independently from each other.
When kn
n
N
=
∑ =
1
1, then K = 0  and Eq.5 reduces to the additive utility function
U x x x k u xN n n n
n
N
( , , .... , ) ( ) .1 2
1
=
=
∑
This representation was first introduced by Fishburn (1964), and in a series of papers he
derived necessary and sufficient conditions in many situations, see Fishburn (1970) for a
detailed account of this work. The additive representation holds under the independence
assumption called preference independence.
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When kn
n
N
=
∑ ≠
1
1, the representation given by Eq.5 is called multiplicative for the following
reason. When kn
n
N
=
∑ ≠
1
1, K ≠ 0 , so multiplying each side of Eq.5 by K , adding 1 to each,
and factoring yields
[ ]KU k u xn n n
n
N
( ) ( )x + = +
=
∏1 1
1
,
where ( )x = x x xn1 2, ,..., .
For other independence concepts and corresponding representations, see Fishburn and
Keeney (1974).
The values of constants k k k N1 2, ,...,  can be found if we can obtain N  linearly independent
equations in these constants. The equations can be obtained as a result of either a certainty
scaling or a probabilistic scaling or both.
Using certainty scaling:
Let x x( ) ( ), ....1 2 1 2∈ × ×RX RX RX N  be two profile vectors, such that the DM is indifferent
between them. Then,
Eq. 7                                                     ( ) ( )U Ux x( ) ( )1 2= .
Eq. 7 combined with the representation given in Eq.5 yields an equation relating the scaling
constants.
Carrying the following type of indifference experiments yields simple linear equations.
Let { }i j N, , ,...,∈ 1 2  and ( )x ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( ), ,..., , , ,...,1 1 2 1 1= − +x x x x x xW W i W i i W NW , where x XRi i' ∈ . The
DM needs to find x XRj j' ∈  such that
( ) ( )x x( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( ) ( ), ,..., , , ,..., , ,..., , , ,...,1 1 2 1 1 1 2 10 1 2= ≈ =− + − +x x x x x x x x x x x xW W i W i nW NW W W j j jW NW
It is easy to verify that ( )U k u xi i ix ( ) '( )1 =  and ( )U k u xj k jx ( ) '( )2 =  which yields equation
k u x k u xi i i j j j( ) ( )' '= .
14
Using uncertainty scaling:
Let x x x( ) ( ) ( ), , ...1 2 3 1 2∈ × ×RX RX RX N  be three profile vectors. Suppose that the DM is
indifferent between profile vector x ( )1  and the lottery x x( ) ( ); ;2 3p . Then,
Eq. 8                              U pU p U( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )x x x1 2 31= + − .
Similarly, Eq. 8 combined with the representation given in Eq.5 yields an equation relating
the scaling constants.
Carrying out the following indifference experiments yield directly the values of the scaling
constants.
Let ( )x ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,..., , , ,...,1 1 2 1 1= − +x x x x x xW W nW nB nW NW , ( )x ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,...,2 1 2= x x xB B NB  and
( )x ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,...,3 1 2= x x xW W NW . Let p p, ,0 1≤ ≤  be chosen by the DM so that
x x x( ) ( ) ( ); ;1 2 3≈ p . Now, using Eq.5, it is easy to verify that
( )U knx ( )1 = , ( )U x ( )2 1= , and ( )U x ( )3 0= . Hence, Eq. 8 yields
k pn = .
We can see that in both methods of scaling , the DM has to choose vector profiles that are
easy to compare and that yield simple linear equations; they do not have to be from those
characterising the available alternatives. The value of constant K  can then be found from
Eq. 6.
In both the certainty and uncertainty scaling procedures, the DM has to decide whether two
profiles or lotteries of profiles are equivalent. As we pointed out above, the decision is not
derived from more basic premises; it is purely subjective. Usually, the DM relies on previous
experience in such comparisons. One of the major problems is that this method yields
inconsistency, and it is therefore necessary to carry out checks and then repeat all over
again if serious inconsistencies are found. It can be very tedious to achieve a satisfactory
utility function in which there are no major inconsistencies, especially with the existence of
environmental requirements.
In addition to the problem of consistency, it is important to check that all the equations
obtained are linearly independent. When there is a large number of attributes, this becomes
operationally difficult.
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Since the critical values from the environment will vary over time, new estimates of the
scaling coefficients are needed. To estimate off-line the scaling coefficients for all possible
values of the critical values cvn  may be very time consuming due to the large number of
combinations that need to be covered, and hence not practical. Therefore, it may be
necessary to find a way to evaluate the scaling coefficients on-line every time there are new
NF-requirements using off-line estimates. This could be achieved in two ways.
1. If the coefficients are evaluated off-line for a “reasonable” number of combinations of the
critical values and the results stored in the memory of the system, then, depending on the
structure that exists in the data, it may be possible to obtain evaluations for new
combinations from the stored data using, for example, numerical interpolation, statistical
techniques or neural networks.
2. If there is a structure in the value trade-offs of the DM, then this can be exploited to
deduce the value of the new coefficients from a previous evaluation. Here we consider an
example of a structure characterised by the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1 ( ASP1 )
Suppose that when the environmental critical values are given by cv = ( , ,..., )cv cv cvN1 2 ,
profile vectors x ( )1  and x ( )2  are equivalent if and only if vectors x cv( )1 −  and x cv( )2 −
are equivalent under no requirements.
Assumption 2 ( ASP2 )
 x cv x cv x cv x cv( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2− ≈ − ⇒ − ′ ≈ − ′  for all cv ′ .
In the indifference experiments done off-line, suppose that the environmental critical
values are set equal to cv cv cvN1
1
2
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
, ,..., . Assume that under these conditions the DM
finds that profiles x ( )1  and x ( )2  are equivalent. Then, from ASP1 , vectors x cv
( ) ( )1 1
−  and
x cv( ) ( )2 1−  are equivalent.
Let cv ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( , ,..., )2 12 22 2= cv cv cvN  describe the new environmental requirements.
Then, from ASP2 , we deduce that vectors x cv
( ) ( )1 2
−  and x cv( ) ( )2 2−  are also equivalent.
But this is equivalent to saying that vector profiles x ( )1  and x ( )2  are equivalent under the
requirements given by cv ( )2 .
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Using the representation in Eq.5, we obtain an equation relating the scaling constants. We
substitute the individual utility u xn n( )  with the parametric function ( )h x cvn x n; ( )2 .
Hence, it is enough to carry out a large number of indifference experiments off-line for a
single combination of critical values, because the resulting equations can be used to find
on-line equations relating the scaling coefficients for all other combinations of critical
values. We need to carry out more than N  indifference experiments, because N
experiments may not be enough to obtain the required N  linearly independent equations
for some combinations of critical values.
But in practice, it is doubtful that the required structures will exist in most cases. Thus,
the method based on the CUF is not operationally applicable, and hence another method
is needed.
4.2 The Nash Solution (Nash [1950])
We propose a solution concept which yields the selection of an alternative which is good in
some well defined sense, without relying on the DM’s value trade-offs. For every attribute
there is a certain preference pattern over the available alternatives. The solution we seek is
the one which achieves a compromise between all preference patterns.
This is the solution we obtain if the DM delegates his decision making to self-interested
rational agents, each representing an attribute. The agent for attribute X n  has utility
function un . The agents will then have to bargain with each other to reach an agreement on
which alternative should be selected. Each agent will try to impose its most preferred
alternative. This solution will yield the alternative that is as satisfactory as possible for each
attribute.
Note that, in this formulation, the DM’s value trade-offs between the attributes are not
incorporated into the structure of the game.
Nash (1950) proposed a solution to the bargaining game. He reasoned that, to avoid the
prospect of not reaching agreement, the players/agents are willing to submit their conflict to
a “fair” arbitrar, an impartial outsider who will resolve the conflict by suggesting a solution.
An arbitration scheme is defined by a function, i.e., a rule, which associates to each conflict,
a unique payoff to the players.  He then gave a number of axioms to formulate
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mathematically our subjective intuition of fairness. We summarise the way Luce & Raiffa
(1957) expressed these axioms verbally.
i.  The arbitration solution should give each player at least as much as he could get under
the worst case, and there should not be any other feasible payoff preferred by all players.
ii.  The arbitration solution should not depend upon the particular utility units used by the
players.
iii.  The arbitration scheme should be egalitarian in the sense that it is independent of the
names or labels attached to the players.
iv.  The solution must be robust. Slight perturbations or errors of measurements should not
alter drastically the arbitrated solution.
Definition (Nash Product) Let ωn , n N= 1 2, ,.., , be a sequence of real numbers such
that 0 1≤ ≤ωn  and ωn
n
N
=
=
∑ 1
1
. Then, the function [ ] [ ]F N: , ,0 1 0 1→  such that
F v v v vN n
n
N
n( , ,..., )1 2
1
=
=
∏ ω  is the (generalised) Nash product (Binmore [1992]).
The coefficients ωn  are a measure of the strength or importance of the players. In our
problem they correspond to importance of the attributes and they need to be evaluated by
the DM. These coefficients are different from the scaling constants of the CUF.
Nash’s original formulation considered only the case with two players with equal
importance.
We choose to construct the individual utilities on the scale 0 to 1, but this choice is
arbitrary. In fact we can assign any positive number to the most desired alternative. But we
must assign 0 to the least desirable to conform with the Nash solution.
The Nash product not only satisfies these four axioms, it can be shown that it is the only
function which does so (Nash [1950]). Hence, these fairness conditions implicitly define a
unique arbitration scheme for bargaining games.
Before we describe the method to find the Nash solution, we will give some definitions.
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Definitions
1. A randomised strategyδ  is an M -tuple ( , ,..., )δ δ δ1 2 M , where δm , m M= 1 2, ,..., , is the
probability of using alternative Am .
2. Let [ ] [ ]EU n M: , ,0 1 0 1→  be a real valued function. EU n ( )δ  is the expected utility of
attribute X n  under the randomised strategy δ  . We have
Eq. 9                                                EU u an m
m
M
m mn( ) ( )δ δ=
=
∑
1
.
3.  A strategy δ  is said to be Pareto optimal if it is not dominated.
4.   A strategy δ  is dominated if there exists a strategy β β β β= ( , ,..., )1 2 M  such that
EU EUn n( ) ( )δ β≤ , for all { }n N∈ 1 2, ,...,  and at least one inequality is strict.
5.  Let ∆  be the set of randomised strategies that are Pareto optimal and such that the
expected utility from every player is positive. Then
{ }∆ = >δ δ δ is  Pareto - optimal and EU n ( ) 0 .
Let ( ) { }V v v v v v EUN n n∆ ∆= = = ∈( , ,...., ) ( ),1 2 δ δ . ( )V ∆  is called the set of Pareto-
optimal payoffs. It can be shown that ( )V ∆  is a portion of the boundary of the convex hull
generated by the points a m m M, , ,...,= 1 2 , which form its extreme points or corners. The
set ( )V ∆  will hence be generated by at most M  points. For example, if there are two
attributes, ( )V ∆  will be either one single point, or a segment, or a finite number of adjacent
segments. The graph below illustrates the set of Pareto-optimal payoffs drawn in bold. It
represents an example with five alternatives and two attributes. The extreme points of the
polyhedron represents four alternatives, and the internal point represents the fifth
alternative.
v1
v2
V ( )∆
    1
0
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To find the Nash solution δ * , we need to solve the non-linear constrained optimisation
problem
( )max ( )
δ
ω
δ
∈
=
∏
∆
EU n
n
N n
1
,
or, equivalently, maximise the Nash product, i.e.,
max
( )v V n
n
N
v n
∈
=
∏
∆
ω
1
.
( )V ∆  is a bounded closed convex set, and the Nash product vn
n
N
nω
=
∏
1
 is a continuous
function. Hence the constrained optimisation problem has a unique solution.
Let ( )v v vN1 2* * *, ,...,  be the point at which the Nash product is maximal. Then, by solving the
system of equations
δm
m
M
m mn nu a v
=
∑ =
1
( ) ,* n N= 1 2, .,.., ,
we can find the optimal strategy δ * .
Characteristics of the Nash solution:
1. There is no need for interpersonal comparison between the utilities of the various
attributes;
2. it is the solution that a fair arbitrar would suggest to the bargaining players. The arbitrar
will try to satisfy some consistency requirements and he will be able to defend his
suggested solutions with some good rationalisation. That is, he should be able to
formulate and to defend the basic principles which lie behind his suggested
compromises-they should not be arbitrary (Luce & Raiffa (1957));
3. it can incorporate the importance or strength of the attributes;
4. this concept yields a definite solution even though the solution is usually randomised.
The following example illustrates the use of the Nash solution concept.
A. There are four algorithms available to select from, each having four attributes. Two of
them are functional - the inputs for temperature and pressure, and the other two are non-
functional - reliability and performance, both of equal importance. Reliability is measured in
average number of failures per year, and the performance is measured in average time in
seconds to process a specified computation. The following table gives the input ranges from
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the environment for both temperature and pressure, the critical values required for the non-
functional attributes, and the characteristics of all four algorithms with respect to functional
and non-functional attributes. The second row contains the critical values for the non-
functional attributes and the input ranges for temperature and pressure in the current
environment.
Reliability
X 1
Performance
X 2
Temperature
I1
Pressure
I2
            Critical Values
Algorithms
1 0.8 (25.0,50.0) (3,8)
A1 0.85 0.80 (15.0,70.0) (2,9)
A2 0.80 0.82 (10.0,90.0) (4,9)
A3 0.90 0.75 (20.0,60.0) (1,9)
A4 0.95 0.70 (15.0,55.0) (2,10)
We can see that algorithm A2  cannot be used because its range of functionality for pressure
does not cover the required range of input in the current environment. We then have the
following table.
Reliability
X 1
Performance
X 2
            Critical Values
Algorithms
1 0.8
A1 0.85
1
0.80
0
A3 0.90
0.5
0.75
0.5
A4 0.95
0
0.70
1
Construction of the utility function:
Let ( )u x h x cvn n n n n( ) ;= . Suppose that the DM is risk-neutral for both attributes over the
whole ranges. So, using Theorem 2, we have
u x
x
x1 1
1
1
0 95
085 0 95 10 9 5( )
.
. .
.=
−
−
= − +
since x1
0 0 95( ) .=  and x2 0 85* .= .
In the same way, we find the expressions of u x2 2( )  which is
                         NF-attributes                     Functional attributes
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u x x2 2 210 8( ) .= − +
The resulting utilities for the 3 algorithms are given in the above table in bold. The
negotiation set is the segment whose endpoints are ( )a1 1 0= ,  and ( )a 4 0 1= , . Note that the
point ( )a 3 05 05= . , .  lies on this segment. Hence the optimal strategy will be a mixture of
algorithms A1  and A4 or algorithm A3  if it is equivalent to the mixture.
The set of randomised strategies to choose from is ( ){ }∆ = = − ≤ ≤δ λ λ λ, , , ,0 0 1 0 1 .
For δ ∈∆ , we have EU1( )δ λ=  and EU 2 1( ) .δ λ= − .
We want to maximise EU EU1 2 1( ) ( ) ( )δ δ λ λ= − over [ ]0 1, .
The product λ λ( )1−  is maximal for λ = 1
2
, so that algorithm A1  should be chosen with
probability 
1
2
 and algorithm A4  should be chosen with probability 
1
2
 .
Let δ * denote the optimal strategy. Then δ * , , ,= 


1
2
0 0
1
2
. The expected utilities for the
NF-attributes are:
( )EU u a1 1 3112( ) ,*δ = =
and
( )EU u a2 2 3212( ) .*δ = =
Hence, it is also optimal to chose algorithm A3 , which is a deterministic strategy.
B.  Everything is as in part A except that the critical value on performance is now 0.75. But
this requirement is only desirable, not strict. The relevant data are in this table.
Construction of the utility function
To obtain its functional form, we would need to carry out several indifference tests.
Here we only have three alternatives, so we only need to find the utility for x2 0 75= . .
We need to find the value of p  such that 0 75 0 7 08. . ; ; .≈ p . Hence
u pu p u p2 2 20 75 0 7 1 08( . ) ( . ) ( ) ( . ) .= + − =
It is then easy to verify that the optimal strategy is
1. for p ≤ 05. , select either alternative A1  or A4  with equal probability;
2. for p ≥ 05. , select A3 .
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4.3 Other Solution Concepts
Without loss of generality, we assume throughout that the high values of an attribute are the
most desirable, and that all the available components satisfy the functional requirements and
the strict NF-requirements.
A. Methods that do not require individual utilities:
Because no utility functions are used in these methods, the decision maker’s strength of
preferences and his attitude to risk are either not incorporated or the DM is implicitly
assumed risk-neutral as in the third method below.
1. Optimal with respect to the most important attribute.
Suppose that attribute X
n*
 is considered to be crucial for a given application, and we want
it to have the best possible value. The optimal component A
m*
 is such that
a a
m n m N mn
* * *max=
≤ ≤1
.
The obtained solution is clearly pareto-optimal.
2.  Minimum weighted sum of ranks
Let rmn  be the rank of component Am  with respect to attribute X n , and let
R rm n mn
n
N
=
=
∑ω
1
be the weighted sum of ranks for component Am . The optimal component Am*  is such that
R R
m m M m
* min=
≤ ≤1
.
Theorem 4 The minimum sum of weighted ranks criterion yields a Pareto-optimal
solution.
Proof: By contradiction. Let A
m*
 be the component with the minimal sum of weighted
ranks. Assume that its profile ( )a a am m m N* * *, ,...,1 2  is not Pareto-optimal. Hence there exists
a component A A
m
∈  such that
a amn m n *≥ for all n N= 1 2, ,...,
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and
a amn m n *> for some { }n N∈ 1 2, ,..., .
Now
{ } { }a a n N r r n Nmn m n mn m n * *, , ,..., , , ,..., ,≥ ∀ ∈ ⇒ ≤ ∀ ∈1 2 1 2
and
a a r rmn m n mn m n * *> ⇒ < .
Because all the weight coefficients and the ranks are positive, we have
R r r Rm n mn n m n
n
N
n
N
m  * *
= < =
==
∑∑ω ω
11
,
which contradicts the initial assumption.         QED.
In the case where there are many options that achieve the minimum, the tie can be broken
by selecting the best option for the most important attribute.
3.  Maximum weighted product
This solution concept is similar to the Nash solution described above, but without the use of
individual utility functions and it is restricted to deterministic strategies. In fact, it implicitly
assumes risk-neutrality and hence the critical values do not appear in the performance index.
It was first introduced by Bridgeman (1922) and used by Miller & Starr (1960) for goal
programming problems. See also the discussion in Johnsen (1968) of this measure of utility
and other measures.
Let
PI a am m m mNN= 1 21 2
ω ω ωα...
be the performance index of component Am . Then the optimal component Am*  is such that
PI PI
m m M m
* max=
≤ ≤1
.
This performance index works well because it is independent of the units in which the
attributes are expressed. It is straightforward to verify that the solution obtained is Pareto-
optimal.
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B. A method that requires inter-attribute utility comparisons: Minimax regret when
the most crucial attribute is unknown
Suppose that for some given application a certain attribute will turn out to be crucial and
hence it needs to take the highest possible value, but this crucial attribute is difficult to
pinpoint in advance. We want to find a selection strategy so as to minimise a measure of
utility loss from not choosing the best component for the attribute which turns out to be
crucial
Let Vmn  be the utility of component Am  when attribute X n  is the only one that matters for
the application and the critical value is cvn . The utilities { }V m M n Nmn , ,..., ; ,...,= =1 1
need to be comparable and thus they need to be evaluated by considering all attributes
collectively, instead of constructing individual utility functions as was done above. This is a
difficult task, and there is no general method for such constructions. We propose the
following method:
1. For each attribute, evaluate ~a
a cv
cvmn
mn n
n
=
−
. Then
~ ~a a V Vmn m n mn m n≥ ⇔ ≥′ ′ ′ ′ ,
for all { }m m M, , ,...,′ ∈ 1 2  and { }n n N n n, , ,..., ,′ ∈ ≠ ′1 2 .
The elements { }~ , ,..., ; ,...,a m M n Nmn = =1 1  are pure numbers whose values are
between -1 and +1, and their comparison is meaningful. But to incorporate the DM’s
intensity of preferences and his attitude to risk, we need to associate a utility to each
normalised value ~amn .
2. Let y
x cv
cv
=
−
. We need to find empirically the functional form of V y( ) , where
[ ] [ ]V : , ,− →11 0 1 , with V ( )− =1 0  and V ( )1 1= .
3. Determine the utilities { }V m M n Nmn , ,... ; ,...,= =1 1  using
V V
a cv
cvmn
mn n
n
=
−


 .
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Note that the lowest utility value is greater than or equal to 0, not necessarily 0. Similarly,
the highest utility value is less than or equal to 1, not necessarily equal to 1. That is the
utilities are not scaled from 0 to 1.
Hence, once the functional form of V y( )  is determined, the utilities Vmn  can be easily
computed during run-time for all critical values.
Let L m n( , )  be the loss in utility when component Am  is used and attribute X n  turns out to
be the most crucial. Then
{ }L m n V V
m M mn mn
( , ) max= −
≤ ≤1
.
Because the most crucial attribute is unknown, this problem can be formulated as a two-
person zero-sum game between the controller and the environment. The environment
chooses the most crucial attribute so as to maximise the DM’s expected utility loss.
The payoff matrix of the game is ( )L m n m M
n N
( , ) 1
1
≤ ≤
≤ ≤
 and it usually yields randomised strategies.
Let
L L m n
m M n N
=
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
min max ( , )
1 1
and
L L m n
n N m M
=
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
max min ( , )
1 1
.
We have
L L≤ .
The DM can guarantee a maximum utility loss of L  by selecting the component for which
L  is attained. This is a deterministic strategy.
The zero-sum game yields randomised strategies except when L L= .
Let ( )δ δ δ δ= 1 2, ,... M , where δm  is the probability that the controller selects component
Am , denote the strategy of the DM. Similarly, let ( )β β β β= 1 2, ,... N , where βn  is the
probability that the most crucial attribute is X n .
Let ( )δ β* *,  be the Nash equilibrium (solution) of the game, and ( )L δ β* *,  the expected
utility loss under the worst case scenario if the controller adopts the randomised strategy
δ * . Then
( )L L L≤ ≤δ β* *, .
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Hence, using the randomised strategy δ * , the DM’s maximum expected loss is less than the
maximum loss under the deterministic strategy.
We also have the following equilibrium inequalities
( ) ( ) ( )L L Lδ β δ β δ β* * * *, , ,≤ ≤ .
The first inequality implies that, whatever the attribute that will turn out to be crucial, the
expected loss is at most ( )L δ β* *,  if the randomised strategy δ *  is employed.
5. Evaluation of methods
In the previous section, we suggested a number of solution concepts and the methods to
compute the solution. The solution concepts that should be adopted depends on the
decision maker’s interests, the information he can provide, the practicality of the
computation, especially during run-time, and most importantly the trade-offs between the
computational effort and the gain in utility over simpler but cruder methods. But the best
way of carrying out such an evaluation is a properly designed experiment in a real situation
using real decision makers (Chankong and Haimes (1983)). Below, we will evaluate
qualitatively the suggested methods with respect to the following criteria:
1. Information required and the manner and extent of the DM’s participation;
2. the type of solution obtained;
3. the computational effort required.
5.1 Required Information
5.1.1 Components’ profiles
In all the methods, the performance of the components need to be measured with respect to
each attribute in some chosen scale. In the minimum sum of weighted ranks method, the
components need only to be ranked from the worst to the best for each attribute, so the
precision in the measurement is less important than in the other methods so long as the
difference in performance between the components is obvious.
27
5.1.2 Individual utility functions
They are required in the combined utility and bargaining solution methods but not in the
other methods. But the constructions are done off-line and involve only one attribute at a
time. The utility functions incorporate information about the DM’s strength of preferences
and his attitude to risk. The minimum sum of ranks method incorporate the least
information about the DM’s structure of preferences.
5.1.3 Value trade-offs
Only the combined utility method incorporates the DM’s value trade-offs explicitly through
the scaling constants evaluated in indifference experiments that can only be carried out off-
line. The off-line evaluations can be used on-line for changing requirements only when there
is a structure in the value trade-offs. Moreover, the method of evaluation of the constants is
subjective and can lead to inconsistencies which can be difficult to eliminate completely.
Other methods such as the minimum weighted sum of ranks, the weighted product and the
bargaining solution use the importance coefficients as partial measures of the value trade-
offs. But their evaluation is subjective and there are no tests to insure consistency as for the
scaling coefficients in the CUF. The Bargaining solution, the weighted product and the
minimum sum of ranks seek the best compromise solution given the information available
and the kind of strategies allowed. So they incorporate an element of value trade-off, but it
is a value trade-off that is not specific to a particular DM, but one that all rational decision
makers with the same weighting coefficients will make. The methods that base the selection
on the most crucial attribute do obviously not incorporate any measure of value trade-offs.
5.2 Type of solution
All the methods suggested yield Pareto-optimal solutions. This is a minimal requirement for
any method. The two solutions based on game theory yield randomised strategies, and
hence perform well on average in the long-term. For instance, the bargaining solution will
yield better results than the weighted product in the long term, notwithstanding that the
latter method incorporates less information on the DM’s structure of preferences.
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5.3 Computational effort
The amount of computations needed and the quantity of information that needs storing vary
greatly between the methods. The methods based on the minimum sum of weighted ranks,
the weighted product, or the best option for the most crucial attribute when it is known
require very simple operations such as sorting, and multiplication, and little storage
capacity. When practical, the combined utility method requires the storage of N  scaled
individual utility functions for all subsets (there can be up to 2 M  subsets) of components
that are admissible for various combinations of critical values, the scaling coefficients for
many combinations of critical values, and the solution during run-time of linear systems of
equations with N  unknowns which represents the major computational operations. The
bargaining solution requires the storage of the individual utilities, and the main
computational is the optimisation of a separable function over the boundary of a convex hull
for which efficient methods exist. In addition this solution is robust.
The minimax regret method requires the construction and the storage of the utility function
V y( ) . The main computation is the solution of a linear program with N  constraints to find
the equilibrium solution.
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Chart of methods for optimal selection of software components under changing
requirements
Start
Availability of
individual utilities
No
Yes
• Minimise sum of ranks
• max ....
1 1
1
≤ ≤m M m mN
a a N
α α
Indifference experiments by
a DM and structure in value
tradeoffs
Yes
No
• Nash solution
• Additive CUF (Preference
independence)
• Multiplicative CUF (Utility
independence)
End
Only the most
important
attribute matters
No
Yes Most important
attribute is known
Yes
• Choose option that
optimises most
important attribute if
known No
• Minimax regret
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